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The change in structure contributed substantially to improving the timeliness and relevance of intelligence analysis in that it created a single point of contact in the analytical element of CIA for senior policymakers.

Other organizational changes:

- The creation of new analytical centers for high priority issues, including technology transfer; terrorism, insurgency and political instability; and foreign counterintelligence analysis.

- CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff has been revived and strengthened.

It had slipped into a reactive mode that was slow to respond to requests and unimaginative in helping policymakers deal with new arms control issues, both on Soviet negotiating behavior and on monitoring issues. New leadership of the staff from within CIA as well as expanded resources have turned this situation around and given the staff a key role in helping to articulate intelligence implications of US and Soviet proposals as well as providing additional support on compliance and negotiating behavior issues.

Changes in National Estimates. As of 1980, the national intelligence estimate had reached the nadir of its fortunes as a means of conveying authoritative intelligence community views for policymakers to the President, the National Security Council and other senior policymakers on key issues. As few as 12 national estimates a year were being completed. The estimates were long in preparation, long in text and played virtually no role in policy formulation.

As of the end of 1983, this situation had been turned around. In 1983, more than 75 NIEs, SNIEs and interagency intelligence memoranda were published. The preparation time on key special national estimates on time-urgent subjects was reduced to as little as a few days. The estimates are timely, policy relevant

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and address issues--such as Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, El Salvador, INF and narcotics--of key importance to the President and his senior advisors.

Estimates have been prepared on subjects such as missile defense, the Soviet approach to arms control and deception and camouflage that have not been addressed in national level intelligence publications in decades. Some subjects, such as the Soviet reaction to INF deployment, have been addressed quarterly for over a year by the Community. Other improvements include:

- The team of National Intelligence Officers now represents a more desirable blend of senior officers drawn from the Department of Defense, the uniformed military, CIA's clandestine service, NSA, the private sector and CIA's analysis directorate.

- There has been great stress on the presentation of differences of view rather than lowest common denominator compromise language. Differences of view are all treated equally in the text of estimates rather than minority viewpoints being relegated to footnotes. Such differences are encouraged.

- In order that senior policy officials can be informed of the results of key estimates quickly, the key judgments are now prepared separately and forwarded to the President and members of the National Security Council the day after NFIB approval. This results in the unusual (and not altogether unwelcome) situation that key figures are informed of the conclusions of important estimates before their subordinates.

- Estimates on many subjects (such as Soviet energy and Mexico's future) now include a list of indicators so that policymakers as well as other readers can see what developments the intelligence community will be looking for as evidence that developments are proceeding as projected or according to some other scenario.

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